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Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion
in Terry Stops in Street Policing
Jeffrey Fagant& Amanda Gellertt
Regulation of Terry stops of pedestrians by police requires articulationof the
reasonableand individualized bases of suspicion that motivate their actions. Nearly five decades after Terry, courts have found it difficult to articulate the boundaries or parameters of reasonablesuspicion. The behavior and appearances of individuals combine with the social and spatial contexts in which police observe them
to create an algebra of suspicion. Police can proceed to approachand temporarily
detain a person at a threshold of suspicion that courts have been unable and perhaps unwilling to articulate. The result has been sharp tensions within Fourth
Amendment doctrine as to what is reasonable, why, and in what circumstances.
The jurisprudence of suspicion is no clearer today than it was in the aftermath of
Terry. This issue has taken center stage in both litigationand policy debates on the
constitutionalityof the stop-and-frisk policing regime in New York City. Under this
regime, police state the bases of suspicion using a menu of codified stop rationales
with supplemental text narratives to record their descriptions of suspicious behaviors or circumstancesthat produced actionablesuspicion.
Evidence from 4.4 million stops provides an empirical basis to assess the revealed preferences of police officers as to the bases for these Terry stops. Analyses of
this evidence reveal narrativesof suspicion beyond the idiosyncrasies of the individual case that police use to justify their actions. First,we identify patternsof articulated suspicion. Next, we show the individualfactors and social conditions that
shape how those patterns are applied. We also show how patternsevolve over time
and become clearer and more refined across a wide range of police stops. That refinement seems to follow the capacious interpretative room created by four decades
of post-Terry Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.Next, we assess the extent of constitutional compliance and examine the neighborhood and individualfactors that
predict noncompliance. The results suggest that the observedpatternsof narratives
have evolved into shared narrativesor scripts of suspicion, and that these patterns
are specific to suspect race and neighborhood factors. We conclude that scripts are
expressions of the norms within the everyday organizationalexercise of police discretion and that these scripts defeat the requirement of individualizationinherent
in case law governing FourthAmendment stops.
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I. POLICING SUSPICION
A.

Double Power

In 2009, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben offered a
useful dichotomy for thinking about how power operates in the
hands of the state.' In one version, state power seeks to limit our
freedom to engage in certain behaviors that may produce social
harms. It is obvious that the police exercise state power to sanction such prohibited behaviors. But state power also limits the
ways in which legal authorities can perform those tasks. The
state does this through a complicated regulatory regimeenforced primarily by the courts but also through democratic
and political regulation-that covers virtually all aspects of
police power.
But there is another form of state power that works somewhat differently; it "affect[s]" what legal authorities "cannot do,
or better, can not do."2 That is, state power sometimes creates
imperatives to act under certain conditions and regulates the instances in which that power can be declined. In the modern policing era, police are obligated to intercede with people and in
situations when they perceive risks or realities of criminal activity. These obligations may trump traditional police discretion
and lead to action when police might otherwise choose to use
less intrusive or coercive forms of their authority. At stake in
this second version of power is not so much what police can do
but the limits on their capacity not to make use of their power.
In the past decade, this double power has created tensions in
modern policing that have spilled over into litigation regarding
the authority of the police to interfere with citizens and
temporarily seize them for questioning without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
The modern apparatus for regulating these tensions is the
Fourth Amendment. Use of this apparatus first appeared in
Terry v Ohio,3 in which the Supreme Court lowered the standard
for a police intervention from probable cause to a newer and proceduralized concept of reasonable and articulablesuspicion.4 On

1 See Giorgio Agamben, Nudities 43-45 (Stanford 2011) (David Kishik and Stefan
Pedatella, trans).
2
Id at 43 (emphasis added).
3
392 US 1 (1968).
4
Id at 33.
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the surface, Terry's goals were simple: determine a set of procedural rules that would control discretion while avoiding the
temptations of extralegal police encounters. Terry created a very
difficult balancing act for police officers and their supervisors:
safeguard the interests of citizens from unwarranted invasions
of their privacy or liberty, yet impose restrictions on those freedoms in the interest of maintaining security and controlling
crime.5
Terry's rules formed the reasonableness core of a new regime governing what police can do and when. The doctrine was
part of a larger social and legal project to constrain police power
in a way that would made it politically and constitutionally accountable, particularly when police power is used against those
who were policed most often and most intensively. Under Terry,
the police are required to articulate specific indicia of suspicion,
and those indicia must be sufficiently salient to justify police
action.6
Modern policing creates that second tension: animating
practices that tell police what they can not do. Policies such as
proactive policing, 7 order-maintenance policing,8 and stop-andfrisk 9 encourage, if not incentivize or even demand, police to

5
See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Stpreme Court's Conference, 72 St John's L Rev 749, 839 (1998) (concluding that "[m]any
thus think of Terry and the law of 'stop and frisk' as . . . a sensible balancing of public
interests in law enforcement against relatively lesser intrusions on personal freedom").
6
See Terry, 392 US at 21-23.
7
Proactive policing instantiates the notions of criminal archetypes by encouraging
police interdiction with persons whom the police decide could be committing a crime, albeit without explicit markers or indicia of suspicion. It anticipates the one-off intervention into a crime in progress in the Terry case. For further descriptions of proactive policing, see, for example, Charis E. Kubrin, et al, Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates
across US Cities, 48 Crimin 57, 62 (2010); Jacqueline Cohen and Jens Ludwig, Policing
Crime Guns, in Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook, eds, Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on
Crime and Violence 217, 217-18 (Brookings 2003) (discussing "targeted policing programs" designed to proactively deter gun violence); Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline
Cohen, DeterrentEffects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension,
22 L & Society Rev 163, 164-66 (1988).
8
For descriptions of order-maintenance activities, see Debra Livingston, Police
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 Colum L Rev 551, 558-60 (1997); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows
Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 Mich L Rev 291, 298-99
(1998) ("Order-maintenance policing ... facilitates the very policy of aggressive arrests
for minor disorderly conduct.").
9 See generally Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk,
10 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 335 (2014); David Keenan and Tina M. Thomas, An
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interdict and temporarily seize citizens on thin or subjective
bases of suspicion. For example, in a secretly recorded stop in
New York City in 2010, a young man named Alvin Cruz asked
an officer why he had been stopped. The officer responded:
"Cause you keep looking back at us."1o Cruz's stop is an example
of the narrowing of discretion by police officers to take action
based less on articulable signs of suspicion than on the very
"hunches" or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion" that Terry rejected.11 The Cruz stop illustrates how, under an expansive
definition of "suspicion," police have little choice about what
they can not do: exercise discretion to avoid contact when suspicion is weak. Administratively, the demand for a steady flow of
stops creates sanctions for police officers whose activity falls below the new benchmark.12
This Essay examines how officers form and apply suspicion
under the conditions that expanded the Terry design,'1 as well as
in policy regimes that narrow the discretion to act on promiscuously formed notions of suspicion. Through the expansion of the
constitutional bases for permissible street interventions, coupled
Offense-Severity Model for Stop-and-Frisks, 123 Yale L J 1448, 1460-62 (2014). For a
broader discussion of the costs of aggressive policing of minor offenses, see generally K.
Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows Policing and the
Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 439
(2010).
10 The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated:An Inside Look at the NYPD's Stop-andFrisk Policy (Oct 9, 2012), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rWtDMPaRD8
(visited Feb 16, 2015). Cruz also said that he had been stopped many times and was
hypervigilant and fearful when he was walking in public and spotted officers. Later on
during the encounter, Cruz was asked whether he wanted to go to jail. He responded by
asking for the reason why the officers were arresting him. One replied: "For being a fucking mutt!" Id.
11 Terry, 392 US at 22, 27.
12 In New York City, institutional pressures urged officers to increase the number
of Terry stops as a prophylactic measure against crime. The pressures included threats
of sanctions for officers whose "productivity" was low, based on the evaluations of their
supervising sergeants. See Graham A. Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: A Shocking Story of
Cops, Cover-Ups, and Courage 43, 64, 182, 236 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) (detailing how
police supervisors threatened officers with workplace sanctions if they did not meet quotas for stops and arrests). See also John Del Signore, Police Union Delegate Caught on
Tape Demanding Cops Meet Quotas (Gothamist, Mar 19, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/66P6-FD4M (citing statements taped at a police precinct by Officer Adil
Polanco, who was later the victim of retaliation from his superiors for publicly revealing
the quota demands).
13 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Terry v Ohio, No 67, *11-12
(US filed Nov 29, 1967) (available on Westlaw at 1967 WL 93603) (enumerating particular factors that police should consider before conducting a street stop or field
interrogation).
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with the narrowing of discretion to not act, officers have developed recurring narratives or scripts of suspicion to satisfy administrative review of their actions and the rare instances of
constitutional challenges to contemporary practices. We begin
with a discussion of the intersection of Fourth Amendment reasonableness doctrine and the social psychology of scripted behaviors. We then examine the development of such scripts in the
context of New York City's aggressive "Stop, Question, and
Frisk" (SQF) policing regime, focusing on the past decade's policing, which led to constitutional litigation and a court order mandating regulatory reforms.14
B.

Suspicion

A series of US Supreme Court cases over four decades expanded Terry's reach and inflated its originally narrow concept
of individualized and reasonable suspicion. 15 Today, neither
courts nor social scientists know very much about how officers
really form suspicion under the expanded Terry doctrine, how
they crystallize specific behaviors to reach a threshold of actionable suspicion, or for which groups of persons that suspicion
most often arises. Race complicates the mix; beyond the suspect's race, the particular social and neighborhood contexts in
which police have everyday contact with non-Whites also influence the formation of suspicion.16 In other words, what appears
suspicious to the average police officer about the behavior of a
Black person may seem less suspicious or even neutral for a similarly situated White person. 7

14

For discussions of the history and practice of the SQF regime, see generally

Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship between the Constitutionalityand Effectiveness
of New York City "Stop and Frisk" 94 BU L Rev 1495 (2014); Meares, 10 Ann Rev L &
Soc Sci 335 (cited in note 9); David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and
Frisk Debate beyond New York City, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 853 (2013).
15 See William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 St John's L Rev 1213, 1213-15,
1217 (1998) (arguing that any attempt to legally regulate street policing is prone to error
since courts are incapable of systematically accounting for the realities of why police engage in certain types of behaviors).
16 See, for example, David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Arrest, 45 Demography 55, 73-74 (2008) (showing empirically that social
context explains racial and ethnic disparities in arrests and that the race-specific social
and political features of neighborhood residential patterns explain variations in criminal
outcomes).
17 See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540, 580-81 (SDNY 2013).
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The reality of how police form suspicion may be far simpler
than the Terry Court envisioned. Professor Jerome Skolnick, riding with police in the 1960s, identified the archetype of the symbolic assailant that police called on to decide whom to put under
their gaze: the person who used certain gestures or wore certain
attire that police saw as predicates of criminal activity.18 In ethnographic research in the 1970s, Professor John Van Maanen
showed that police classify people into three categories: "suspicious persons," or those who police have a reason to believe may
have committed a serious offense; "assholes," or those who do
not accept the police definition of the situation and fail to give
deference to the police; and "know nothings," or those who are
not in either of the first two categories but are not police and
therefore cannot understand what police do or why they do it.19
Suspicious persons are particularly recognizable by their appearance and behavior in public areas, especially for their
furtive and nonroutine movements.
In addition to examining behavioral indicia of suspicion,
Professors Rod Brunson and Ronald Weitzer showed the importance of appearance and social expectations. In their street
research on police-citizen encounters in and around St. Louis,
being out of place and defying racial boundaries aroused police
suspicion and, at times, verbal and physical aggression by police.20 In an observational study of police, Professors Irving
Piliavin and Scott Briar reported that appearances conforming
to a delinquent stereotype often animated officers to initiate a
street detention and interrogation, often in the absence of any

18 See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic
Society 45-47 (John Wiley 1966). Skolnick cites an article by Thomas Adams, a "police
expert," that summarizes the characteristics that make persons suspicious enough to
merit a field interrogation, including automobiles that do not 'look right," persons out of
place, known troublemakers, persons who evade or avoid the officer, persons wearing a
coat on a hot day, persons near a crime scene, and persons who are visibly rattled by a
policeman. See Thomas F. Adams, Field Interrogation,7 Police 26, 28 (Mar-Apr 1963).
19 John Van Maanen, The Asshole, in Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen,
eds, Policing:A View from the Street 221, 223 (Goodyear 1978).
20 See Rod K. Brunson and Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White
Youths in Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 Urban Affairs Rev 858, 866-68 (2009) (reporting that White youths who were spotted in certain Black neighborhoods were viewed
suspiciously by officers, and that the risk was greatest when the White youths were in
mixed-race company or wearing what was deemed racially inappropriate clothing). See
also generally Victor M. Rios, Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys
(NYU 2011).
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evidence that a crime had taken place.21 One police officer told
them that he had stopped and questioned a youth who looked
"suspicious."22 The officer said that this young man was suspicious because he was "a Negro wearing dark glasses at midnight."23 These officers simply assumed from departmental statistics that youths who "look tough" committed crimes more
often and that this justified their heightened suspicion.14 For
these officers, actuarial suspicion was sufficient to justify a
street detention.
In fact, officers in the decades prior to Terry were rarely
trained on the specific indicia of suspicion and were granted
broad discretion when deciding whether to use their full authority. Professor Joseph Goldstein cited a New Mexico statute, stating that police were granted broad discretion with the duty to
enforce only "if the circumstances are such as to indicate to a
reasonably prudent person that such action should be taken."25
Goldstein also cited the Introduction to the Atlanta (Georgia)
Police Department Rules and Regulations, which includes an affirmation by officers declaring that their "eyes must be open to
. .. slinking vice in back streets and dives ... [and] the suspicious appearance of evil wherever it is encountered.26 Despite
Terry and four decades of expansion of the concept of reasonable
suspicion, there has been little progress toward articulation of
behavioral indicia that can, ex ante, inform police discretion.
One of our students, a former NYPD officer, complains that "we
are trained how to make stops, not when to make them."
More recently, Professor Geoffrey Alpert and his colleagues
showed that police on patrol are more likely to view a minority
citizen as suspicious based on nonbehavioral cues-location, associations, and appearances-while relying more often on

21
Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 Am J Sociology 206, 212-13 (1964) (discussing how police officers decide to initiate encounters with
juveniles, and describing the factors that motivate those encounters and explain their
outcomes).
22
Id at 212 n 22.
23 Id.
24 Id at 212 (describing "look[ing] tough" as including wearing "chinos, leather

jackets, boots, etc").
25 Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: LowVisibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L J 543, 557 n 26 (1960),
citing NM Stat Ann § 39-1-1 (1954) (emphasis omitted).
26 Goldstein, 69 Yale L J at 559 (cited in note 25).
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behavioral cues to develop suspicion for White citizens.27 Professors Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski observed police stops
and searches and concluded that officers based nearly half of
them on constitutionally insufficient criteria.28 Professor Bernard Harcourt went deeper into the Gould-Mastrofski data to
show how an institutional account of policing at the intersection
of drug profiling and community policing helped create narratives that served as pretexts to justify decisions about whom to
search and how the search should unfold.29
In recent years, case law has expanded the logic and substance of reasonable suspicion. For example, Illinois v Wardlow30
broadened the boundaries of suspicion to allow consideration of
a person's presence in a "high crime area.' ' 3 1 But Wardlow and
other cases left unsettled exactly what constitutes a high crime
area 32 and how police are to factor location into individualized
behavioral indicia of suspicion such as "casing." In fact, there is
no constitutional consensus as to how much suspicion is needed
to give rise to reasonable suspicion. 33 Nor are there substantive

27 See Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald, and Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and DiscretionaryDecision Making during Citizen Stops, 43 Crimin 407, 422-23
(2005) (showing that whether a suspect is Black influences an officer's decision to form
suspicion based on nonbehavioral versus behavioral cues).
28 Jon B. Gould and Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior under the US Constitution, 3 Crimin & Pub Pol 315, 325, 330, 333, 345-46 (2004)
(showing that officers violated Fourth Amendment standards for searches in 46 percent
of a sample of 44 searches and 571 encounters, based on ratings of researcher-generated
narratives, a sample of which were checked by a panel of defense lawyers, prosecutors,
and retired judges, who agreed with 90 percent of the researcher's assessments).
29 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 Crimin & Pub Pol 363, 366-67 (2004) (describing how community policing
officers invoked a drug-enforcement rationale to stop a suspect without any indicia of
drug use or possession and proceeded to conduct a fruitless cavity search).
30 528 US 119 (2000).
31 Id at 124-25 (determining that flight from the police in a "high crime area" could
constitute reasonable suspicion for a stop). See also Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L.
Meares, Randomization and the FourthAmendment, 78 U Chi L Rev 809, 862-64 (2011)
(using data from studies of street stops to explore the empirical implications of
Wardlow).
32 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "more than mere war stories [from
police testimony] are required to establish the existence of a high-crime area" and that
courts must "examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion." United
States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122, 1139 n 32 (9th Cir 2000). See also United
States v Bonner, 363 F3d 213, 218-19 (3d Cir 2004) (Smith concurring) (discussing possible burdens of proof for establishing that an area is "high crime").
33 See Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 536-37 (1967) ("Unfortunately,
there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails.").
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indicia to prioritize or weigh which behaviors or factors matter;
the courts have said only that these indicia must be reasonable.
Some courts have argued for an outcomes test, but there too,
there is no agreement on what constitutes an acceptable "hit
34
rate" that satisfies the reasonableness standard across cases.
Telling police what they can not do with respect to stops has
pushed the boundaries of both reasonableness and suspicion beyond what the Terry Court may have envisioned as a set of
workable rules implemented by experienced police. The configuration of Terry and its progeny tends to assume that there is a
threshold of suspicion that renders police action constitutionally
permissible. Suspicion in this formulation thus becomes a hurdle
model, or a binary category, in which the stop is either constitutional or not.35 Courts worry more than the police about whether
there is enough suspicion to get over that hurdle and satisfy the
"individualized" suspicion test. And the elasticity of the Terry
standards complicates the job of courts to regulate those
decisions.
So the determination of suspicion, and whether the quantity
of suspicion is enough to motivate action, is now about subjective and probabilistic assessments of capricious signs that, in
Terry's language, "criminal activity may be afoot." 36 Suspicion
has become the application of ex ante factors of what suspicion
ought to look like in a particular circumstance. Still, contemporary standards do not really tell a police officer doing modern police work how much suspicion is enough to satisfy constitutional
standards. 37 Officers are left to the extremes of roll call training
on the one hand and litigation challenges on the other to define

34 In Navarette v California, 134 S Ct 1683 (2014), Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that at least 5, if not 10 percent, of the entire universe of incidents would need to be
an accurate "hit" to be indicative of reasonable suspicion. Id at 1695 (Scalia dissenting).
According to Scalia, absent such a showing, the basis of suspicion is not reasonable without further information. A similar outcomes test was considered in Floyd to claim that
the police were so often wrong in the bases of suspicion for their stops that those bases
were faulty. See Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 559, 575 (pointing to the fact that "[tihe rate of
arrests arising from stops is low .. and the yield of seizures of guns or other contraband
is even lower," and noting "that the City's attempt to account for the low rate of arrests
and summonses following stops was not persuasive").
35 See Harcourt and Meares, 78 U Chi L Rev at 811 (cited in note 31).
36 Terry, 392 US at 30.
37 See notes 7-9. See also Tracey L. Meares, ProgrammingErrors: Understanding
the Constitutionality of Stop and Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U Chi L Rev
161, 172-76 (2015).
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a space in which their actions comport with the shifting territory
of the Fourth Amendment.38
Those who would regulate the use of these standards have
to apply good faith assumptions that the officer is accurately reconstructing the triggers and clues that move her action beyond
merely a hunch. When officers do articulate their bases of suspicion, they often do so after the fact-after the contact is resolved
one way or another and sometimes after a further delay. 39 This
allows the emotional baggage of both the officer's individual perceptions and the aftermath of the interaction to carry over. Recording therefore happens after there has been some level of
emotional arousal-which often happens in the company of
4o h
peers and supervisors who may weigh in on the interaction
and well after the original bases of suspicion have been validated or not. Telescoping and other cognitive distortions come into
play as officers try not only to reconstruct their own thinking
but also to accurately portray the actions and settings of an in41
dividual in a moment of salience, if not arousal.
So, how much can we trust the accuracy and neutrality of
these "accounts" of perception, cognition, and decisionmaking? It
is hard to come up with a clear answer to this question since
there is little opportunity for observing police behaviors other
than real-time recording. While there have been experimental
studies on police reactions to provocative situations, 42 there is
less data about the everyday encounters that make up much of
modern police work in an era of proactive engagement and
38 See Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law on the
Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 Emory L J
295, 319-31 (2000).
39 See Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 578 (noting that the UF-250 forms used to record
Terry stops are "prepared by officers shortly after the stops," and discussing the form's
flaws, including that it is "one-sided" and "not always prepare[d]").
40 See The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated (cited in note 10). In the video, the
sergeant can be heard in the background at several points over the course of the stop escalating the tension by interpreting Alvin's responses as challenging the officer's
authority.
41 See George D. Gaskell, Daniel B. Wright, and Colin A. O'Muircheartaigh, Telescoping of Landmark Events: Implications for Survey Research, 64 Pub Op Q 77, 77-87
(2000); David C. Rubin and Alan D. Baddeley, Telescoping Is Not Time Compression:A
Model of the Dating of Autobiographical Events, 17 Memory & Cognition 653, 653-55
(1989).
42 See, for example, Modupe Akinola and Wendy Berry Mendes, Stress-Induced
Cortisol Facilitates Threat-Related Decision Making among Police Officers, 126 Behavioral Neuroscience 167, 172-73 (2012) (showing that officers' thresholds for shooting at
suspects vary according to their biologically measured stress in the immediate situation).

2015]

Followingthe Script

stop-and-frisk. The inherent limitations in accurate accounting
of what constitutes reasonable suspicion suggest some caution in
offering generalizations about what we might call the "cognitions of suspicion."
C.

Stop-and-Frisk as Police Actuarialism

The dilution and recasting of suspicion after Terry took
place in the same era as developments in the practice of policing
that curtailed officer discretion and mandated police action regardless of the circumstances. 41 Stop-and-frisk tactics are the
natural successor to the new policing regimes, from broken windows theory 44 to order-maintenance policing (OMP),45 hot spots
policing,46 and proactive policing47
Stop-and-frisk as envisioned by the Terry Court was largely
a set of distinct "retail" transactions, characterized by individualization, material or visual indicia, and specificity. But the current "wholesale" practice is quite different from the vision of the
Terry Court. 48 It incorporates elements of OMP by substituting
social disorder for suspicion of imminent or current criminal activity. It incorporates elements of hot spots by privileging high
crime neighborhoods with saturated enforcement in the search

43 See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urban L J 407, 441
(2000). See also note 12.
44 See generally James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic
Monthly 29 (Mar 1982) (suggesting that social and physical disorder in neighborhoods is
strongly linked to crime rates in those places). See also Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and
Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods 65-124 (Free Press
1990). But see Harcourt, 97 Mich L Rev at 302-05 (cited in note 8).
45 See Livingston, 97 Colum L Rev at 562-91 (cited in note 8) (arguing that social
disorder such as loud music, boisterous street behavior, and petty criminal activity are
signals of more serious crime and should be met by police with street detentions if not
arrests). Arrests based on probable cause for minor crimes simplify the task of moreintrusive interactions during these encounters, including searches for weapons or contraband, or warrant checks for scofflaws or fugitives. See generally Brief of Dr. Ian
Ayres, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, Dr. Richard Rosenfeld, Anthony Thompson, Dr. Geoffrey
Alpert, David Rudovsky, Dr. Andrew Gelman, Dr. Bernard Harcourt, Dr. Robert Crutchfield, Dr. Christopher Winship, Dr. Peter Siegelman, Dr. David Greenberg, Dr. Justin
Wolfers, and Tracey Meares as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Faulkner v United
States, No 11-235 (US filed Sept 23, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 4479100).
46 See Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, eds, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence 237-40 (National Academies 2004) (describing the nuances that distinguish policing strategies and tactics that focus on specific places).
47 See note 7.
48 See generally Meares, 82 U Chi L Rev 161 (cited in note 37).
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for suspicious activity that may signal crime. 49 Individualized
suspicion is thin and diluted, predicated not just on signs of social disorder but also on metrics that assign suspicion to people
collectively in places based on crime rates. In effect, individualized suspicion defaulted to appearance-based regulation and actuarial logic.o The "specific and articulable facts" that Chief Justice Earl Warren required in Terry are lost in an actuarial
matrix of collective suspicion. Suspicion, then, has broadened into an exercise in Bayesianism, actuarial profiling, and prospect
51
theory in action.
Imagine, then, how individualized suspicion is constructed
when police are mandated through institutional pressures to
maximize stops. The answer is that it is not. Just as stops have
become an administrative regime, so too has suspicion become a
de-individuated feature of the encounter. In New York City, approximately 19,000 patrol officers made nearly 5 million street
stops from 2004 to 2013, rising from fewer than 100,000 in 2003
to over 685,000 in 2011, before tapering off in late 2012 through
2013.52 Most stops were concentrated in a relatively small number of neighborhoods with high crime rates, concentrations of
non-White residents, and severe socioeconomic disadvantage.53
The mandate for ever-increasing stops thus created a demand
for narratives of suspicion to justify those stops. But throughout
this period, serious crime was declining sharply in New York

49 The hot spots regime anticipated very small spaces where there would be recurring crime. But these are assessed by its proponents as street segments or intersections.
See, for example, David Weisburd, et al, Trajectoriesof Crime at Places:A Longitudinal
Study of Street Segments in the City of Seattle, 42 Crimin 283, 291, 294 (2004) (showing
the recurring, disproportionate concentrations of crime in very small areas in Seattle).
Instead, stop-and-frisk regimes target large residential and occasionally commercial
areas, eschewing the microscopic perspective on specific locations. See Report of Jeffrey
Fagan, PhD, Floyd v City of New York, 08 Civ 01034 (SAS), *11, 32 (SDNY filed Oct 15,
2010) ("Fagan Report").
50 See Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Context and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 Harv L Rev F 97, 99-102 (2012). See also
Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv L Rev 1563, 1620-34
(2012).
51 See generally Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment, 27 J Econ Persp 173 (2013); Daniel Kahneman, Thinking,
Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979).
52 The Stop, Question and Frisk Data (New York City Police Department, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/AKK3-24DN. Original analyses are available from the
authors.
53 See Fagan Report at *11, 32, 36-38 (cited in note 49).
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City. 54 The prerequisite of individualized suspicion, then, conflicted with the dwindling supply of available criminal activity.
In the face of actuarial suspicion, how was individualized suspicion managed? From the experience with stop-and-frisk in New
York City, our Essay suggests an answer to this question.
D.

Scripting Suspicion

In three out of four street stops in New York City, police observe a suspect for less than two minutes before proceeding to
what state law s5 defines as an "intrusion.56 The stop requires officers to perform a quick perceptual and cognitive sorting of
complicated and highly contextualized information that shapes
the initial evaluations of suspicion. As the interaction unfolds,
this sorting is modified and narrowed through interactions and
exchanges between the suspect and the officer(s). The setting in
which the interaction takes place-location, time of day, presence of bystanders, local social and crime conditions, and personal baggage that each party brings to the event-interacts
with the details of the event to shape the verbal and perhaps
physical exchanges that take place, the decisions within the
event and its outcome, and how the event is perceived and reconstructed once it concludes.
The question for this Essay is whether individualized suspicion gives way to the convenience of cognitive or perceptual
scripts-stylized narratives of suspicion-when police discretion
narrows to limit what police can not do, or, in other words, to
mandate what they are obligated within their command structure to do. Scripts are handy conveniences to manage complex
cognitive tasks, especially when those tasks become burdensome
in the face of both administrative demands and the need to articulate a basis for action.
What, then, is a script? Script theory offers a way of generalizing, organizing, and systematizing knowledge about the processual aspects and requirements of recurring events. The
54 See Joseph Goldstein, Safer Era Tests Wisdom of "Broken Windows" Focus on
Minor Crime, NY Times Al (July 25, 2014). See also Franklin E. Zimring, The City That
Became Safe: New York's Lessons for Urban Crime and Its Control 6-7 (Oxford 2012).
55 See People v De Bour, 352 NE2d 562, 571-72 (NY 1976). In contrast to the twostage inquiry developed in Terry, De Bour articulates four levels of suspicion correlated
with four levels of justified intrusion. See also People v Hoilman, 590 NE2d 204, 205
(NY 1992).
56 See note 52.
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theory borrows heavily from cognitive psychology and was best
articulated by Professor Robert Abelson in 1976.5 For Abelson, a
"script" is a cognitive structure or framework that organizes a
person's understanding of typical situations, allowing the person
to have expectations and to make conclusions about the potential result of a set of events. 58 Script theory has been widely used
in social psychology to identify patterns of decisionmaking and
social interaction that persist among persons within social networks.59 Professor Derek Cornish regards scripts not only as organizing tools for connecting events but also as procedural tools
for decisions about how to proceed within events. 60
Over time, these ideas and scripts become socially contagious within and then across social networks, spreading from
person to person and across nodes of people.61 In this case, we
might hypothesize that there are memes of suspicion among

57 See generally Robert P. Abelson, Script Processing in Attitude Formation and
Decision Making, in John S. Carroll and John W. Payne, eds, Cognition and Social Behavior 33 (Lawrence Erlbaum 1976).
58 See id at 33-34. See also generally Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the
Script Concept, 36 Am Psychologist 715 (1981).
59 See generally, for example, Abelson, 36 Am Psychologist 715 (cited in note 58).
Script theory can explain contagion in several ways. See Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson, and Garth Davies, Social Contagion of Violence, in Daniel Flannery, Alexander
T. Vazsonyi, and Irwin D. Waldman, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior
and Aggression 688, 691 (Cambridge 2007):

(1) Scripts are ways of organizing knowledge and behavioral choices; (2) individuals learn behavioral repertoires for different situations; (3) these repertoires are stored in memory as scripts and are elicited when cues are sensed in
the environment; (4) the choice of scripts varies among individuals, and some
individuals will have limited choices; (5) individuals are more likely to repeat
scripted behaviors when the previous experience was considered successful; (6)
scripted behavior may become "automatic" without much thought or weighing
of consequences; and (7) scripts are acquired through social interactions among
social network members.
Within structurally equivalent networks, such as professions or unions, similarly situated people are likely to influence or adopt behaviors from one another that can make
those people and their ideas more attractive as a source of further relations. See id
at 692.
60 See Derek Cornish, The ProceduralAnalysis of Offending and Its Relevance for
SituationalPrevention, in Ronald V. Clarke, ed, 3 Crime Prevention Studies 151, 157-59
(Criminal Justice 1994). Cornish's "script" focuses in detail on the step-by-step procedures of committing crime that are learned, stored in memory, and enacted when situational cues are present. See id at 155-59.
61
See Deanna L. Wilkinson and Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence
"Scripts" The Dynamics of Gun Events among Adolescent Males, 59 L & Contemp Probs
55, 65 (1996). See also Fagan, Wilkinson, and Davies, Social Contagion of Violence at 691
(cited in note 59).
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police that are articulated through repetition and practice, valued for their utility within social networks, and then adopted
and applied in a probabilistic way to a set of recognizable circumstances and situations.
Police ethnographers in the decade bookending the Terry
opinion-such as Jerome Skolnick, John Van Maanen, Egon
Bittner62-constructed categories that collapsed suspicious persons, appearances, and behavior. The effects of such group categorization are well understood, with research originating with
psychologist Gordon Allport in 1954 and continuing for the ensuing six decades.63 The moving parts of the process involve human
information processing and heuristics to classify individuals
based on that information (with updates). Categories are essential to navigate through a world of uncertainty in social interactions. In the case of police stops, the embedding of social
interactions in locations and institutional frameworks adds layers to the categorization process. Prior experience and
knowledge are important in creating a set of categories that
seem to work, in that they efficiently sort persons or events.
As the early police ethnographers suggest, the number of
categories is limited (due perhaps to capacity), so that police (in
our case) are forced to group heterogeneous experiences into the
same categories. When the prior groupings can no longer resolve
the indicia that a person or event presents, new groupings may
be created in a process (one hopes) of Bayesian updating.64
The early ethnographies suggested simple schemes, perhaps
even binaries. The Van Maanen typology of three groups seemed
optimal for police to accomplish their work.65 Skolnick suggested
62
See Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 Am Sociological Rev 699, 703 (1967) (describing the police responsibility to respond to people
that they view as "less than fully accountable for their actions"). See also generally Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in UrbanSociety (Doubleday 1967).
63
See, for example, Roland Fryer and Matthew 0. Jackson, A CategoricalModel of
Cognition and Biased Decision Making, 8 BE J Theoretical Econ *1 (2008). See also generally Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley 1954); Gordon W.
Allport, The HistoricalBackground of Modern Social Psychology, in Gardner Lindzey, ed,
1 Handbook of Social Psychology 3 (Addison-Wesley 1954).
64
For an example on criminal behavior, see generally Shamena Anwar and Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayesian Learning Theory of Deterrence among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49 Crimin 667 (2011).
65 Van Maanen also suggests what the appropriate responses are to each group. For
instance, the "assholes" were worthy of street justice-meaning physical assault-simply
to reinforce the power hierarchy of the police in the areas of their routine activity, regardless of whether the "assholes" had broken any laws. See Van Maanen, The Asshole
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a binary scheme, building on both his own conclusions about
suspicious archetypes and the work of other police professionals
who used their own criteria for sorting.66 Perhaps such binaries
are optimal in modern police work since the action that follows
the categorization is a seizure or street stop. The sorting and
categorization task is of interest, then, in understanding how
suspicion is constructed and how much suspicion must be present to animate police action.
Experience matters in the weighting of the indicia of suspicion. But so too does the institutional dimension that impels action. In an institutional design that urges-or mandatesaction, the threshold is likely to be forced downward. Cognitive
processing of the appearances of suspicion may produce a large
pool of potential suspects for stops; however, which members of
that pool are ultimately stopped may have more to do with an
external threshold than with the natural or deregulated decision
of the individual officer.
E.

What Police Can Not Do

To explain what police do, it is important to understand
what police can do and can not do: how they are constrained by
dual power. The constitutional rules of engagement ensure that
police behavior unfolds in a regime of constrained situations. Police actions lie somewhere between "ritual and strategy,67 constrained and shaped by three factors: the situational dynamics
of everyday stop activity, institutional preferences and demand
for contact, and their ex ante assumptions about suspects' behaviors. The first of these factors creates a wide space for the influence of the other two. That is, the boundaries of what police
can not do are widened in a regime that values volume. This in
turn requires that police invoke scripts to simplify complex and
charged cognitive landscapes to shape what is said and what
happens in the course of each of multiple contacts. 68 And, because these events unfold through time, the meanings of suspicion at the outset of a contact are likely to shift as new

at 224 (cited in note 19). See also John Van Maanen, Observations on the Making of Policemen, 32 Hum Org 407, 407-18 (1973).
66 See text accompanying note 18.
67 See generally Jeffrey C. Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics:Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy, 22 Sociological Theory 527 (2004).
68 See id at 550.
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information is revealed. In other words, it is not just physical
shoehorning of complex information on a small administrative
form that leads to scripting,69 but also conceptual shoehorning of
complex social interactions into narrow categories whose fit with
the reality of the encounters may be poor.
It is this gap-which we claim shows the distance between
normative and revealed preferences-that we examine in this
Essay. Normative preferences represent an agent's actual interests, whereas revealed preferences represent the tastes that rationalize the agent's observed actions70 In the context of street
stops, normative preferences ought to be revealed by an observable pattern of stops, informed primarily by local crime and social conditions. Revealed preferences are observable as well: the
factors that animate stops for specific crimes should be influenced by the local prevalence of that particular crime. In other
words, in a constitutional regime that demands individuation of
suspicion, suspicion for specific crimes would reflect factors
unique to that crime, specific with the boundaries set by
71
case law.
Revealed preferences reflect tastes or interests that the
agent is pursuing through the use of her power. Those tastes
could map well onto the demands of a constitutional policing regime if agents were able to "consume" only those stops that fit
the law. In that case, revealed preferences would be identical to
normative preferences. This would signal that the margin for
discretion had been properly narrowed by an institutional design that demanded compliance with law. In the case of dual
power, what police can do is shaped and constrained by law.
Of course, if those constraints are not imposed, or if they are
compromised by institutional preferences, dual power might
lead to a gap between normative and revealed preferences. This
gap suggests the influence of "true" preferences.72 If tastes differ

See Appendix.
See John Beshears, et al, How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J Pub Econ 1787,
1787-90 (2008) (showing how actual preferences may differ from what the stated or even
best interests of an agent might be). See also generally Richard H. Thaler and Cass R.
Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale 2008).
71 For example, stops in which a violent crime is suspected should be informed by
factors that express behaviors consistent with a violent crime.
72 See Beshears, et al, 92 J Pub Econ at 1787-89 (cited in note 70). Revealed preferences could be as simple as taste but could also reflect limited experience, decisionmaking errors, proximity, complexity, and "third-party marketing" of available
69
70
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from what the boundaries of the law permit, the gap between
normative and revealed preferences will widen. In the case of
modern dual power, when police are told what they can not dothat is, told to limit their search for suspects to instances of individualized and articulable suspicion-we would expect their
revealed tastes and preferences to be skewed to fit particular
circumstances that they might not otherwise choose for action.
Under a proactive-policing regime, in which police are incentivized to make stops that may exceed in number what the contexts
provide, dual power creates incentives, if not mandates, for stops
in which the rationales are stretched beyond the boundaries and
requirements of law. 73 It is in these instances that we believe
that officers invoke scripts to explain and justify their actionsscripts that exceed the margins of what the circumstances might
otherwise offer.
The next Part empirically details these preferences and the
extent of the gap between them. We observe this in the articulation of reasonable and individualized suspicion under New York
City's stop-and-frisk regime of the past two decades.
II. EMPIRICS OF SCRIPTED SUSPICION
The New York City stop-and-frisk data74 provide an opportunity to assess recurring patterns and narratives of suspicion
and to discern whether these patterns show sufficient consistency to take on the characteristics of a script. Data from 4.7 million stops from 2004 to 2012 reveal what officers see in the runup to street stops. First, we can exploit these data on police
officers' accounts of the reasons and bases for effecting a Terry
stop. Second, using the same data, we can assess the extent to
which, within the limits of reporting, police officers adhere to

logics. See generally Kahneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica 263 (cited in note 51)
(discussing cognitive errors in decisionmaking that result from external pressures).
73 Continuing the above example of the stop for violent crime, in a regime in which
suspicion is diluted by the pressures of dual power, officers might explain a stop by invoking factors not only consistent with a violent crime but also with other more diffuse
and nonspecific rationales such as furtive movements, evasive actions, or area
characteristics.
74 The NYPD has published downloadable case records annually for all stops from
2003 to 2013. See NYPD, The Stop, Question and Frisk Data (cited in note 52). For the
following analysis, we use data from 2004 to 2012 and follow a similar methodology to
the analyses in Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540 (SDNY 2013).
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Terry's individualization requirement or instead develop recurring and stylized narratives of suspicion.
A.

The Empirical Project

Following the stipulated settlement in Daniels v City of New
York 75 in 2003, police and plaintiffs agreed to a set of law-related
checkboxes to replace the previous narrative format for recording Fourth Amendment stop justifications.76 The Daniels plaintiffs had claimed Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations
in the SQF program, and the settlement mandated procedures
7
for NYPD officers to record the rationale for stops.
The boxes included nine affirmative stop rationales plus an
option to check "other" and record the specifics by hand. 78 The
nine rationales were identified jointly by the Daniels plaintiffs
and the City, incorporating a set of categories based on both
state and federal case law that would survive a Fourth Amendment test for the individualized stop rationales. On the reverse
of the form, officers were trained to record a series of "additional
circumstances" to justify the stop. 79 Officers could check as many
boxes as needed to express the basis for the stop.
Table 1 lists the twenty stop factors and additional circumstances available to officers; the form itself is shown in the Appendix. About 95 percent of the stops from 2004 to 2012 checked
75 Stipulation of Settlement, Daniels v City of New York, 99 Civ 1695 (SAS), *8-9
(SDNY filed Dec 31, 2003) ("Daniels Settlement").
76
See id at *22. The checkboxes were incorporated into the standard reporting form
for stops, the UF-250. They were a set of indicia of suspicion derived from the aggregate
experiences of officers who had been conducting stops over many years, in consultation
with plaintiffs' counsel in the Daniels litigation. See Fagan Report at *48-49 (cited in
note 49) (concluding that the indicia of suspicion in the checkboxes were group-based
identifiers rather than markers of individual behavior).

For the most part, suspicion attaches to group-based traits, conditions, and behaviors: the police identify sets of individuals with motives, such as individuals
who match a drug courier profile, individuals whose behavior fits a pattern of
someone casing a store for a possible burglary, individuals who fit an eyewitness description, individuals who occupy a specific location where crimes
may be prevalent, or individuals whose movements signal that they are concealing contraband. These are not individual markers of suspicion, but in fact
are constructed categories that the officer who has determined that a suspect is
"suspicious" must use as an organizing scheme to express the bases of
suspicion.
Id at *49.
77 Daniels Settlement at *8-9.
78 See id at *22.
79 See id at *23.
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from one to six factors, creating 60,459 possible combinations
that express the bases of suspicion for this subset. Because of
redundancy in the meanings and descriptions of these factors,
we reduced the twenty to a set of nine distinct factors. The first
column in Table 2 shows the reduced factors, and the second
column shows the components based on the original set of
twenty.
TABLE 1. SPECIFIC STOP CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF STOPS BASED ON EACH FACTOR
Factor

Percentage
of Stops

Area Has High Crime Incidence
56.0%
Time of Day
36.9%
Casing
28.8%
Changed Direction
24.0%
Other Stop Circumstance
20.2%
Proximity to Scene
20.1%
Evasive Response
17.1%
Fits Description
17.0%
Acting as Lookout
16.9%
Ongoing Investigation
12.8%
Report of Witness or Victim
12.4%
Drug Transaction
9.3%
Suspicious Bulge
8.9%
Actions Indicate Violent Crime
8.0%
Clothing Used in Crime
4.3%
Other Additional Circumstances
4.3%
Associating with Known Criminals
3.7%
Suspicious Object
2.7%
Sights and Sounds of Criminal Activity
2.3%
N=4,559,624
Notes: The total exceeds 100 percent because the majority of stops have multiple factors indicated. Stops
are excluded if the suspect's age is below ten or above
eighty-five years.
Source: NYPD, The Stop, Question and Frisk Data
(cited in note 52).
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2. USE OF SUSPICION FACTORS WITH COMPONENTS, NYPD
STREET STOPS, 2004-2012

Factor

Percentage
of Stops

Crime
Location

73.1%

Evasive/
Furtive

54.9%

Casing

35.7%

Other

22.0%

Fits
Description

21.5%

Suspicious
Object

12.7%

Drug
Transaction

9.3%

Criminal
Appearances

Components
"Area Has High Incidence Of Reported Offense Of Type
Under Investigation"
"Time Of Day, Day Of Week, Season Corresponding To
Reports Of Criminal Activity"
"Ongoing Investigations, e.g., Robbery Pattern"
"Proximity To Crime Location"
"Furtive Movements"
"Evasive, False Or Inconsistent Response To Officer's
Questions"
"Changing Direction At Sight Of Officer/Flight"
"Actions Indicative Of 'Casing' Victim Or Location"
"Actions Indicative of Acting As A Lookout"
"Other
Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity"
"Ohr
'Other"
"Fits Description"
'Report From Victim/Witness"
"Suspicious Bulge/Object"
"Wearing Clothes/Disguises Commonly Used In Commission Of Crime"
"Carrying Objects In Plain View Used In Commission Of
Crime"

8.2%

"Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Drug Transaction"
"Suspect Is Associating With Persons Known For Their
Criminal Activity"
"Sights And Sounds Of Criminal Activity, e.g., Bloodstains, Ringing Alarms"
"Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Violent Crimes"

8.0%
Violent
Crime
N=4,559,624
Notes: A factor is said to appear in a stop if at least one included component is indicated by the NYPD. The total exceeds 100 percent due to multiple factors indicated
per stop. Stops are excluded if the suspect's age is below ten or above eighty-five
years.

We used two empirical strategies to illustrate the narrowing
and patterning of suspicion as articulated by officers through
this system. The first charts the use of each of the nine composite factors over time. We show this through a set of graphs that
chart the use of each factor for each calendar quarter from 2004
to 2012. Table 3 shows the characteristics of the persons stopped
in this period.
The second examines a set of regression models that attempt to explain stop patterns over time within New York City's
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seventy-six police precincts80 We first estimate the regressions
without including the stop factors. We estimate models for all
stops and then disaggregate stops by the suspected crime that
animated the stop. We then add the suspicion factors to determine the extent to which individualized suspicion improves the
model fit and its explanatory power. Individualized and reasonable suspicion should clarify the patterns of stops, revealing the
actual preferences of officers in forming suspicion to make stops.
We estimate these models for the total number of stops recorded
and then disaggregate by the suspected crime in the stop. Across
a range of suspected crimes, we assess the extent to which
stated suspicion factors explain the variation in stop activity.

80 Precinct 22, the Central Park precinct, is omitted due to low population, crime,
and stop activity.
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TABLE 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTS IN NYPD STREET
STOPS, JANUARY 2004 TO JUNE 2013
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Other or Unknown

9.8%
51.9%
30.6%
7.6%

Age
Mean
Standard Deviation

28.1
(11.5)

Sex
Male
Female
Unknown

90.2%
7.0%
2.8%

Suspected Offense
0.1%
Murder
8.3%
Drug
15.6%
Violence
18.4%
Weapons
19.1%
Property
9.2%
Trespass
1.3%
Quality of Life
28.1%
Other
N=4,783,793
Notes: The total for suspected offenses exceeds 100
percent due to rounding. Stops are excluded if the
suspect's age is below ten or above eighty-five years.
Source: NYPD.

B.

Dilution, Expansion, and Dependence

Over time, officers identified progressively more circumstances to justify their stops. Figure 1 shows that the average
number of factors identified by officers has grown by about 30
percent over 9 years, from 3.0 factors per stop to 3.8 factors per
stop. The number of stops in which officers checked off 5 or more
factors rose 79 percent from 2004 to 2012, from 16.5 to 29.5 percent. This could reflect better training and sensitivity to the specific circumstances surrounding each stop, but as the graphs in
Figure 2 suggest, it more likely reflects a decreasing sensitivity
or greater shoehorning of the realities of stops into the available
reporting categories.
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FIGURE 1. FACTORS PER STOP, 2004-2012
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Over time, officers increasingly relied on a narrow set of
specific factors to articulate individualized suspicion. Figure 2
shows a set of simple graphs charting changes in the use of each
of the stop factors over time. In these graphs, we look for patterning and narrowing in order to examine whether the specificity of the reasons for stops has been diluted over time, in contrast to the individualization requirements of both state and
81
federal case law.

81 See Terry, 392 US at 22, 27; People v De Bour, 352 NE2d 562, 568-70 (NY 1976)
(articulating the standard for search and seizure under New York common law). See also
Meares, 82 U Chi L Rev at 172-74 (cited in note 37) (showing the mismatch between the
factors identified by the Terry Court and the factors on the UF-250).

Following the Script

2015]

FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF STOPS USING EACH SUSPICION FACTOR
BY CALENDAR QUARTER, 2004-2012
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Several distinct patterns are evident. First, three factors are
used infrequently though consistently over time. "Drug Transaction" is marked in about 10 percent of all stops, as are "Criminal
Appearances" and "Suspicious Object."82 The number of cases in
which officers check "Suspicious Object" rose over time from 10
percent to 15 percent of stops, but the increase is slight in degree. "Criminal Appearances" was consistently marked in just

82 An officer cannot stop or frisk an individual simply because the person possesses
a "suspicious object" that could either be contraband (including a weapon) or be innocently possessed. See People v Francis, 847 NYS2d 398, 401-02 (NY Sup 2007) (holding that
an officer who observed an object that looked like a knife, which was clipped inside a
suspect's pocket, did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the knife was not a
permissible knife). Without additional indicia of suspicion, the fact that an individual is
in possession of objects commonly used in the commission of crimes does not provide an
officer with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop or frisk that individual. See People v Saad, 2008 WL 747895, *5 (NY Crim) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a man seen walking down the street, pushing a shopping cart with a tire
iron protruding, and looking into parked cars). A stop might be justified if there is evidence that the object has just been or is about to be used in a crime. See People v Brown,
297 NE2d 94, 95-96 (NY 1973) (holding that an officer did not have probable cause to
arrest a person for possession of a burglar's tool and stolen property, but that the officer
could have made an investigatory stop of a man seen exiting a building holding a
crowbar and a car battery that had torn cables on it).
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under 10 percent of stops. The use of the "Violent Crime" marker
rose over time from about 5 percent of all stops to 10 percent,
but stayed low. Officers seem to take some care in using these
three factors, suggesting a measure of individualization under
particular circumstances.
Other factors are used consistently over time or with little
variation, but at a higher rate. At least one of the "Fits Description" indicators is marked in 21.6 percent of stops but varies
within a narrow range and declines slightly over time.83 "Casing"
84
exhibits a similar pattern: it is checked in 35.6 percent of stops.
Use of this factor rises from about twenty percent in 2004 to
nearly 30 percent by the end of 2011. While falling within the
broad conceptual space of "reasonableness," these two factors
are not as much about individualization of suspicion as they are
about serving as handy bins of suspicion that judges can easily
understand to satisfy constitutional review.
Reasonable suspicion based on this factor requires a specific description that
points to a specific suspect. See People v Thomas, 752 NYS2d 70, 71 (NY App 2002)
(holding that a "vague and general description of a Black male wearing black clothing
was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that he was the perpetrator"). This factor is also vulnerable to broad interpretation and misuse. In Brown v City of Oneonta,
221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 1999), police responded to the victim's description of a "young"
"black man" who had cut himself during a struggle over a knife used in a 1992 assault
that took place near the local college campus. Id at 334. The police obtained a list of
every Black male student at the college and began a sweep that resulted in stops of approximately two hundred students and nonstudents, including at least one woman. Id at
334, 338.
84 "Casing" is a term that can describe a wide range of behaviors, but ascertaining
the intent of these behaviors requires a knowledge of the context and persistence of the
suspicious behavior. A person looking into car windows might either be casing cars or
considering purchasing a similar car. In these instances, the burden falls on the police
officer to conduct a lengthy and detailed period of observation to confirm that these are
in fact preludes to a potential crime and not incidental or casual activities. See Terry,
392 US at 28 (1968) (upholding a stop-and-frisk when an officer suspected three men of
casing a store in preparation for a daytime robbery because the officer observed the suspects for nearly twenty minutes before conducting the stop); United States v Padilla,548
F3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir 2008) (holding that a detective's observation of two men quietly
following another individual into a secluded area while attempting to remain in the dark
and out of the individual's peripheral vision "supported the detective's suspicion that the
two men might have been targeting the disheveled man for a robbery" and justified a
stop-and-frisk); People v Richard, 668 NYS2d 386, 387 (NY App 1998):
Reasonable suspicion supporting the forcible detention of defendant was supplied by lengthy police observations of defendant's complex, unusual, and suspicious pattern of "casing" -type behavior, strongly suggestive of a known series
of armed robberies in the neighborhood that targeted movie theaters in particular, coupled with the fact that defendant met a general description of one of
the robbers.
83
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The use of either of the two "Other" factors declined between
2004 and 2011, from nearly 30 percent of all stops to just below
20 percent. The decline in use of the opportunity to tailor and
articulate the suspicion rationale suggests increasing comfort
with the broad bins offered by the other categories and perhaps
a shift among officers toward de-individuation when offered a
suspicion recipe or menu. It could also be simply an efficiency
choice: checking "Other" imposes an additional recording burden
to state the specific circumstances that fell outside the easier
choices. And if officers invoke additional factors that boost the
amount of suspicion-such as "High Crime Area" combined with
suspicious movement85-the need to record exact details of suspicion is mooted. Absent an institutional demand for strong articulation of the bases of suspicion, officers can avoid details
when satisficing on the recording burden to show just enough
suspicion.86 None of these interpretations suggests stronger
compliance with Terry's (and De Bour's) individuation demands,
and they instead suggest an increase in officers' comfort with
other shortcuts to establishing reasonable suspicion.
Two factors in particular suggest the presence of a script
and its development over time. First, officers increasingly relied
on the "Evasive/Furtive" movement factor over time. One or
more of its components was checked off in about 40 percent of all
stops in 2004, rising to over 60 percent in 2011. The term "furtive movements" can be used to refer to an almost-infinite number of actions that an officer might find suspicious. This factor is
vague in its meaning and subjective in its interpretation. In
some instances, a furtive movement might be a strong signal
that a suspect is carrying a weapon.8 7 But in others, as in Alvin
85 See Wardlow, 528 US at 124. But the Wardlow Court offered no test for what
constituted a "high-crime area." See United States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122,
1138, 1139 n 32 (9th Cir 2000) (concluding that a suspect's presence in a high-crime area
is not enough to support reasonable and particularized suspicion and that the factor
must "not [be] used with respect to entire neighborhoods ... in which members of minority groups regularly go about their daily business"). See also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson
and Damien Bernache, The "High-CrimeArea" Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am U L Rev
1587, 1588 (2008) (demonstrating that current Supreme Court jurisprudence provides
those in "high-crime area[s]" with less-robust Fourth Amendment protections).
86 Chief of Patrol, Police Department, City of New York, Required Activity Log Entries Regarding UF250's (Mar 5, 2013) (requiring officers to provide narrative detail of
the specific indicia of suspicion in each stop) (on file with authors).
87 See, for example, United States v Graham,483 F3d 431, 439 (6th Cir 2007) (upholding a search in part because the suspect's movements were "consistent with an
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Cruz's stop, a "furtive movement" may be nothing more than a
glance at an officer or, fearing an encounter with an officer, hurrying down the street to avoid police contact.88 There is considerable space between those poles for an officer to use this particular factor to motivate and justify a stop. The general failure of
officers to find guns in the millions of stops during this time is
another sign of the expansive interpretation of this factor.89 Its
increasing use suggests its core role in a script of suspicion.
Second, nearly three in four stops used one or more indicators of crime location consistently over the nine years. "High
Crime Area" is vulnerable to subjective and highly contextualized interpretation. Under Wardlow, the "High Crime Area" rationale can be used to multiply the constitutionality of other factors which, standing alone, are insufficient to justify a seizure.9o
Table 2 shows that the "Area Has High Incidence Of Reported
Offense" factor was used in more than 55 percent of all stops
during this period. As shown in Figure 2, together with other indicia of crime location, 75 percent of all stops were based in part
on the "Crime Location" metafactor, which incorporates the
"High Crime Area" notation.
The scripted nature of this suspicion is demonstrated in
Figure 3. To construct this figure, we analyzed the specific locations of each stop and the reported crime rates in the stop's
location. We divided the city into quintiles, or 20 percent brackets, in which the lowest quintile includes the safest 20 percent of
precincts, and the highest quintile includes the 20 percent with
the highest crime-complaint rates. As shown in Figure 3, a stop
made in the lowest-crime quintile has a nearly identical probability as a stop in the highest-crime quintile to be identified as
occurring in an area with "high incidence" of crime. Similar
attempt to conceal a firearm"). Absent movements indicating that a suspect might be
armed, furtive movements cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion. See, for example,
People v Powell, 667 NYS2d 725, 727-28 (NY App 1998) (holding that officers did not
have reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect who responded evasively to questioning and
was walking with his arm stiffly against his body in a high-crime area); United States v
McCrae, 2008 WL 115383, *1-10 (EDNY) (holding that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect who moved his hand "from the center of his stomach to the
left side of his waistband" in a manner that the officer claimed was similar to how an
officer handles firearms while in plain clothes).
8 See note 10 and accompanying text.
89 Only 0.15 percent of all stops in the UF-250 database analyzed for Floyd led to
the seizure of a gun. See Fagan Report at *63 (cited in note 49).
90 See Wardlow, 528 US at 124-25. See also Ferguson and Bernache, 57 Am U L
Rev at 1588 (cited in note 85).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:51

results were found in tract-level analyses, suggesting that the
propensity to identify an area as "high crime" is not driven by
small hot spots in large precincts. 91
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF STOPS FOR "HIGH CRIME AREA" AND

"FURTIVE MOVEMENT" BY PRECINCT CRIME QUINTILE
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Again, as in the other indicia of individualized suspicion,
there is a gradual and persistent process of desensitization in
the interpretation of these factors, allowing officers to use these
factors to conform their perceived suspicion to the prevailing
narratives in which NYPD officers conduct their patrols. The
trend toward increasing use of the "Evasive/Furtive" factor may
simply reflect the adoption and spread of a cognitive framework
to filter perceptions of the criminogenic and disorderly characteristics of police patrol sectors. 92 In turn, officers may reflexively attribute the conditions of local crime and social disorder to

91 See Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, PhD, Floyd v City of New York, 08
Civ 01034 (SAS), *43 (SDNY filed Dec 15, 2010).
92 See Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows", 67 Soc Psychology Q 319,
330-34 (2004) (showing empirically that perception of disorder in neighborhoods is correlated not only with observation of disorder but also with the racial composition of the
neighborhood).

2015]

Following the Script

all persons in that area. Again, one can see a widely shared
script emerging and taking hold in the perceptual frames of
patrolling officers.
C.

Normative and Revealed Preferences

Next, we estimated the extent to which explanations of stop
patterns are improved when the suspicion factors are added to
regressions based solely on offense or offender characteristics.
By identifying whether the additional knowledge of the suspicion factors improves our understanding of stop patterns, we can
distinguish between normative and revealed preferences. Patterns of suspicion that explain a large portion of variation in
stop patterns across several types of suspected crimes may suggest normative preferences. Conversely, suspicion patterns that
are substantively uncorrelated with the suspected crime may
suggest that suspect behaviors of the offenses are poorly linked
to their suspected crimes.
We first estimated regressions to explain the stop patterns
within police precincts based solely on local crime and social
conditions. We assume that these reflect officers' normative
preferences for suspicion. Then, we expanded the regressions to
include the percentage of stops in each precinct-quarter claiming
each of the suspicion factors in Table 2.93 If individualized suspicion is functioning well as a set of standards guiding officer discretion when making stops, 94 the inclusion of these standards in
a regression analysis explaining stop patterns should improve
the strength of the model, or the model fit.95
93 Regression models were estimated in two stages. First, a series of negativebinomial regressions were estimated, predicting stop counts overall as well as by suspected crime. Each model includes: (1) precinct racial composition, (2) total precinct residential population, (3) precinct socioeconomic status, (4) local crime conditions (the
percentage of crime complaints that corresponds to the suspected crime for the model),
(5) patrol strength, and (6) a dummy variable indicating whether the precinct was one of
the four business precincts. Then, for each model in Table 4, the same model was estimated again, this time including a variable for the percentage of all stops in the precinct
justified by each suspicion factor.
94 NYPD officers are trained to conduct SQF interventions under guidelines articulated in the NYPD Patrol Guide. See New York City Police Department, Patrol Guide
Manual (2006 ed.) §§ 211-11, 696-7 (on file with authors).
95 Model fit is the capacity of a statistical model to capture the variance of a phenomenon across sampling units. The goodness of fit of a statistical model is typically
measured by the discrepancy between observed values and the values expected under
the model in question. Such measures can be used in statistical hypothesis testing. Here,
we report the Pseudo R2, a measure that shows model fit for regressions of events such
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Table 4 summarizes four features of these analyses for each
crime-specific model. First, it shows the explained variance, or
goodness of fit, for each model without consideration of the stop
or suspicion factors. Goodness of fit is measured with a
marginal-R 2 statistic, which is used to measure model fit for
Generalized Estimating Equations.96 The next five columns show
results when the NYPD suspicion factors are incorporated into
the model. The third column shows which of the stop factors or
additional circumstances were statistically significant positive
predictors of the number of stops. The fourth column shows the
statistically significant negative predictors: those factors that
were significantly less likely to appear in a pattern of crimespecific stops.
The fifth column shows the marginal R 2 for each crimespecific model when the stop factors are included. The sixth column shows the change in the marginal R 2 that estimates the
improvement over the model without stop factors. If reasonable
suspicion is in fact animating these stops, the regressions should
show a convergence between the normative and revealed preferences in police stop decisions. Overall model fit should improve
at the margins when more-accurate explanatory information is
included. In other words, more information should lead to less
chance as well as a more systematic understanding of how often,
where, and under what circumstances stops take place. That is,
revealed preferences should tell us more about stop patterns
than when that information is masked.

as police stops. For information on calculating fit in such models, see generally David W.
Hosmer and Stanley Lemesbow, Goodness of Fit Tests for the Multiple Logistic Regression Model, 9 Communications in Stats-Theory & Methods 1043 (1980).
96 See generally Gary A. Ballinger, Using Generalized Estimating Equations for
LongitudinalDataAnalysis, 7 Org Rsrch Methods 127 (2004).
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TABLE 4. FACTORS PREDICTING STOP RATES BY SUSPECTED
CRIME AND CHANGE IN MODEL FIT, ALL STOPS, 2004-2012
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Two trends stand out in Table 4. First, overall model fit improves little with the addition of the suspicion factors. The improvement was 10 percentage points or fewer for five of the seven models. For these stops, the positive predictors of stop
activity suggest few crime-specific references. Stops for most
crime types are predicted by "crime location," suggesting that officers may be invoking a convenient script that is difficult to
challenge. The "crime location" script-like the "suspicious object" rationale in weapons stops-does away with the more demanding task of articulating individuated actions and is not easily challenged under current case law. 97 In other words, most of
these models are tautological with the promiscuously invoked
"high crime area" script.98
Second, model fit improves by more than 10 percentage points
for only drug stops and trespass stops. Drug stops are significantly
more prevalent in precinct-quarters where "Drug Transaction"
narratives are cited in a greater proportion of stops. Estimated
model fit for drug stops nearly doubled: the marginal R 2 for drug
stops increased from .29 to .52. While this is substantively consistent, no other behavioral cues are predictive of drug stops (only
the environmental cue of "Crime Location"), raising concerns that
the "drug transaction" justification may be tautological and may
fail to capture the individual behaviors indicating how a suspect's
actions indicated a drug transaction. Trespass stops were significantly more prevalent in precinct-quarters in which stops are more
often justified with "Crime Location," "Other," and "Drug Transaction" narratives, and the marginal R2 for these stops increased
from .30 to .57 when suspicion factors are included. Trespass stops
were concentrated in public housing sites, 99 and the prevalence of
97 See note 85.
98 See notes 85 and 90 and accompanying text.
99 See Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies, and Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 697, 716-17 (2012) (showing the heavy
spatial concentration of trespass stops in New York City public housing sites from 2004
to 2011). Public housing was a primary target of drug-law enforcement beginning in the
1970s and was declared by definition a high-crime area by the NYPD. See generally
Escalera v New York City Housing Authority, 425 F2d 853 (1970) (describing a program
of drug arrests and summary evictions of residents in public housing who were accused
by NYPD Housing Bureau patrols of drug possession or trafficking); Gregory Fritz
Umbach, The Last Neighborhood Cops: The Rise and Fall of Community Policing in New
York Public Housing (Rutgers 2011) (describing the shift during the 1970s from a community policing regime to a proactive-policing regime in public housing).
The increase in the marginal R2 in these two models results primarily from the fit of
the location (public housing) and circumstance (drug transactions) to the RS factors,
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"Crime Location" rationales is likely based on the categorization
of public housing as a problematically crime-ridden venue. 100
While some public housing sites indeed face crime rates significantly higher than surrounding areas, not all do. However,
agreements between the New York City Housing Authority
(NYCHA) and the NYPD, most notably the Trespass Affidavit
Program, expand police enforcement authority to make stops
and arrests at lower levels of suspicion in both NYCHA and privately owned housing, not only those with elevated
crime rates.10
Conceptually, without a stop and an inquiry of a suspect
about his presence in a public housing site, it is difficult to imag102
ine ex ante factors that would lead to suspicion of trespass.
NYPD officers routinely claimed "High Crime Area" as the stop
rationale in trespass stops, based on the categorization in policy
of public housing as a problematically crime-ridden venue. 10 3
Again, little information is provided about the specific behaviors
that motivated a stop.

without saying precisely which behaviors other than the offense itself characterize "suspicion." For example, "Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Drug Transaction" predict drug
stops, and "High Crime Area" and "Drug Transaction" predict trespass stops (which are
concentrated in public housing). Accordingly, the meanings of these suspicion factors
with respect to the suspected crime are dictated more by policy than by individualized
behavioral descriptions. In the current procedure for recording RS bases of stops, the behavioral meaning of the act is removed from the design of the specific factor that the
officer indicates.
100 See Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 102 Colum L Rev 2002,
2004-11 (2009).
101 See id at 2019 n 116, 2020-23 (showing the incentives for effecting stops in public housing sites that equate presence in the locale with behavioral indicia of suspicion).
102 See id at 2002 (showing the failure of trespass enforcement practices under the
NYPD stop-and-frisk regime to comport with Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonable-and-articulable suspicion).
103 See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, PhD, Davis v City of New York, 10 Civ 0699 (SAS),
*3 n 3, 5 (SDNY filed June 2012). See also Davis v City of New York, 902 F Supp 2d 405,
416 n 67; Carlis, 102 Colum L Rev at 2009-11 (cited in note 100); Ligon v City of New
York, 925 F Supp 2d 478, 484-85 (SDNY 2013) (noting that police trespass stops in and
around high-rise residential buildings lacked individualized and reasonable suspicion).
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CONCLUSION

As stops increased in New York City from fewer than
100,000 in 1998 to more than 685,000 in 2011,104 individuated
suspicion was diluted as officers defaulted to convenient and
stylized narratives to justify stops. In turn, we suspect that police constructed scripts of suspicion that could be tailored and
invoked to fit the cosmetic or epidemiological circumstances of a
stop. The weak evidence of specificity in stop patterns, coupled
with the reliance on a small number of factors to justify individualized suspicion, hints at the drift toward memes and scripts to
satisfy a weakly enforced and regulated Fourth Amendment regime. When repeated across tens of thousands of interactions,
and when knowledge of these interactions is shared within
dense social and informational networks of officers, narratives
are shaped and reinforced in a process that combines selfpresentation with job performanceo1 5 and allows officers to give
plausible accounts of their actions1
o0 that minimally conform to
the requirements of training and law.107
When there is a burden on officers to develop sustainable
narratives across innumerable events, social networks become
important places to practice and refine plausible narratives of
suspicion. The narratives, in turn, become scripts that are widely shared. They are handy cultural tools to simplify complexity.108 The scripts are "rules" that shape, both cognitively and
perceptually, how situations are perceived, how to choose among
contingent actions to proceed (or not) with a stop, what language
and tone is used, and how to respond to any of several reactions
from the suspect. To some extent, such formalities or patterned
104 Eliot Spitzer, The New York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices:A
Report to the People of the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General 132-34
(Civil Rights Bureau 1999). See also Stop-and-Frisk Data (New York Civil Liberties
Union, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5XK-FXFR.
105 See Erving Goffman, The Presentationof Self in Everyday Life 17-25 (Anchor
1959) (providing professional examples of "the individual's own belief in the impression
of reality that he attempts to engender in those among whom he finds himself'). See also
generally Paul Marsden, Memetics and Social Contagion: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 2
J Memetics-Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission 68 (1998).
106 See generally Marvin B. Scott and Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 Am Sociological Rev 46 (1968).
107 See Hirokawa, 49 Emory L J at 307 (cited in note 38).
108 See generally Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 Am
Sociological Rev 273 (1986) (explaining that tool kits include habits, skills, and styles
from which individuals select lines of actions). See also Paul DiMaggio, Culture and
Cognition, 23 Ann Rev Sociology 263, 269 (1997).
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responses to a heavy workload and set of administrative demands are unavoidable. But when built into everyday practice,
the use of scripts, memes, or stylized narratives poses critical
challenges for Fourth Amendment regulation.
Regulation fails in this regard since the scripts seem to sustain a regime that is remarkably inefficient at detecting criminal
wrongdoing while simultaneously failing to satisfy even today's
weak Fourth Amendment standards.109 It is more than reasonable to ask how useful it is to memorialize these categories and
scripts when the rates of arrest, prosecution, and conviction are
so low. The centrality of these scripts to what the federal court
found to be a constitutionally deficient regime suggests that
Terry's balancing act has gone awry.

109 See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540, 573 (SDNY 2013) (noting that
police took no further law-enforcement action in about nine out of every ten stops).
Among those stops subject to court review, nearly half fail to reach a conviction, suggesting an error rate of nearly 95 percent. See A Report on Arrests Arisingfrom the New York
City Police Department's Stop-and-Frisk Practices *3 (New York State Office of the Attorney General, Civil Rights Bureau, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5Z9B-9EVC.

88

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:5 1

APPENDIX: UF-250 FORM

(
STOP,QUESION
AND
FRISXFdSerial No.
REPORT
WORKSHEETZ
P
D
11-021
P0344-151AtROY.

fOc

lToeOtStop IP~oObservaion
IRedioRuwarint#
PriorToStop
Addressrintamoctioa
OrCross
Streets
OfStop

Specifyihicd Feiony/PL
Misdemesanor
Buspae

Whatn eChrmar

Q

I

Duraio OfSa

I

Whiochty LedToStop?

0MU8TCHECK~
ATLEAST
ONE BOotX)0
COaaem
PlainView
1 AC InWast ltO(rve Of
Usdm*ert~sltO~rem
I rDoAreosactla

0FOS
esorUo

EWM

(

I

0 kdomldlom~Ecerf

O$AtemetotiloAdAmA

Correa~rsed
In

D Sep~bBuissladeposoue)

Iii i

atsorcme

aOfwRenaW~eouspiVooe0Cne
A"rtd(Spe*d)

Nam
Of
Person Sopped
Address

Data
Ofts

Nooa

S

No. I

NAp

Identification:0 Verbael 0 PresooID.
13 Refused
0Other(Spelf)
.
Seofl) Me ftaas:0Whi te~ Pdap OBlecit 6Hsai d la rl
Prarsel 0 AsWodt Islande, r
s
loan Natie
I Welgit
, Hmsir "Eye at. lu l
Age
elgt

TaaNo
BW

HLOOgoo
m

If Ptryscfforce WaUsd to11l

WnerOteesonappedl 0

ustloerisretle

Otrl(eiO

Ifahsicum orc s Use d, Olfee Tye:1

andes On Sup

OffiSpcnnlt

a

rrest o~eoenfed?
Ofne

YsO t o

Mea
No

~

S~

Typo

List

~

I

PdSot os

rh

I

a~nbv~ mors No

Arest

-

No.~ar

!vris

Ia 1 1

.6

I

Ii 1

